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4Abstract
This paper investigates the dynamics and determinants of having 
access to social insurance coverage on the Egyptian labor market among 
wage and non-wage workers.  Using data from the 1998 Egypt Labor 
Market Survey and the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, the paper 
specifically tackles two questions: Who has social insurance coverage? and 
who has his/her basic wage underreported? The first question investigates 
the worker -and enterprise- level determinants of having access to social 
insurance. The second question analyzes the risk of underreporting 
insurable wage to the social security authority.  The results show that men, 
older, married, better educated and white collar highly skilled workers are 
more likely to have social insurance coverage.  Access to social insurance 
is more likely to exist in the public sector and in large private enterprises. 
Furthermore, acquiring social insurance coverage in the private wage work 
sector does not often come at first entry; but it takes some time to gain 
such access. In contrast, experience is not important for acquiring social 
insurance coverage among non-wage workers.  Underreporting insurable 
wages is negatively correlated with levels of education and labor market 
experience.  Also, the likelihood of underreporting increases with monthly 
basic salary and years to retirement age.
JEL Classification: H55, C34
Keywords: Social Security, Social Insurance, Social Protection, 
Endogeneity, Instrumental variables.
1. Introduction 
In Egypt, as in many developing countries, the convergence of poverty 
and lack of social security places the working poor in a very vulnerable 
situation that has always mandated immediate action in research and 
programmatic interventions. Before the January 25th revolution, a focus 
on social security was relevant in view of the insecurities instigated by 
increasing market liberalization and the shrinking role of the state in 
services and employment. Nevertheless, the revolution and its aftermath 
heightened sense of insecurity and labor protests have mandated a 
serious re-evaluation of recent labor market policies and the whole 
social protection system in Egypt. This makes issues of social security, 
employment and household livelihood strategies of particular relevance 
now more than ever.
5Egypt has a history of providing social security and social assistance 
projects. Following the socialist 1952 revolution, Egypt adopted a social 
insurance system that is considered to be a fully funded universal scheme. 
This system consisted of collecting contributions from employees during 
their work years, depositing it into a pension fund, investing the money, 
and then finally repaying back the money to the employee in the form 
of old age pension. However, in more recent years the system became 
increasingly dependent upon financial support from the Egyptian Treasury, 
and thus, has become only partially funded (EHDR 2005). 
The participation of wage workers in the social security system is 
compulsory according to the law (79/1975), but voluntarily for non-wage 
workers (law 108/1976). Nevertheless, not all private sector employers 
follow the law.. The high social insurance contribution rates required from 
the employers cause many of them to either underreport the basic salary 
of their employees to the social insurance authority or not cover their 
workers at all (EHDR 2005).  On the other hand, some wage workers 
queuing for public sector jobs may choose not to be insured in the private 
sector, thinking that this might minimize their opportunities in being 
employed in the public sector (Barsoum et al. 2009). Also, wage workers 
may negotiate, with their employers, higher pay in return for not having 
social insurance. Many others are quite ignorant about the whole system 
of social insurance and its benefits (see Sieverding 2012).
This paper aims to investigate the distribution and determinants of 
access to social insurance coverage using available data from two rich 
nationwide labor force sample surveys: the 1998 Egypt Labor market 
Survey (ELMS 98) and the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS 
06). More specifically, this paper tackles two questions: Who has social 
insurance coverage? and who has his/her basic wage underreported? The 
first question investigates the worker- and enterprise- level determinants 
of having social insurance coverage. The second question analyzes whether 
the worker’s basic wage reported to the social insurance authorities is 
distinct from his/her actual wage.  The aim of this last analysis is to shed 
light on the phenomenon of underreporting of the basic salary in the 
private wage sector in Egypt.
This paper is organized into seven sections.  Following this introduction, 
Section 2 gives a brief background on the social insurance system in Egypt. 
Section 3 reviews the existing literature on social insurance and informal 
employment. Section 4 presents the data used in this paper. Section 
5 presents descriptive results on the pattern and dynamics of social 
insurance coverage among wage and non-wage workers. The estimation 
methodology and results of the determinants of social insurance coverage 
and underreporting of basic wage are discussed in Sections 6 and 7. 
Conclusions and policy considerations are provided in Section 8. 
62. Background: The Egyptian Social Insurance System
Social insurance schemes in the Middle East and North Africa region 
were drawn in the early 50s and are mainly managed nowadays as Defined-
Benefits Pay-As-You-Go (DB-PAYG) system. Under this DB-PAYG 
scheme, the contributions of current active members are used to pay the 
pensions of the retired members, and the benefits are determined as a 
defined percentage of the average monthly wage earned in the last few 
years before retirement. These schemes usually cover workers in the 
public and the private sector, and include the military in Arab countries. 
The contributions to these schemes are paid jointly by workers, employers 
and the government (ILO 2009; SSA 2011). 
Since the 1952 revolution, Egypt has implemented a new widely 
stratified social insurance system (SIS) operated as a fully funded scheme 
where employees pay their contributions that should be invested and 
repaid to them in the form of old age pensions. This system has gradually 
shifted to be a partially funded Pay-As-You-Go system, which receives 
support from the Treasury, with defined benefits scheme that is equal to a 
set percentage of the average monthly wage earned (UNDP 2005).1 
The Egyptian SIS provides old-age, disability, survivors, sickness, 
maternity, work injury and unemployment benefits to workers and their 
dependants. The system is mainly regulated by four laws, which are law 
79 for 1975 for wage workers, law 108 for 1976 for employers and self-
employed, law 50 for 1978 for Egyptians working abroad, and law 112 for 
1980 for workers who are not included in any of the previous schemes. 
Furthermore, prior to the January 25th, 2011 revolution, a significant 
reform of the social insurance system was passed through Law 135 of 2010, 
during the time of the old regime in Egypt, but the status of this law is still 
unclear due to the events of the revolution. 
Law 79 for 1975 draws the general scheme for the system, insuring all 
government, public sector and private sector employees. Contributions 
are deducted from two types of monthly wage earnings: the basic and the 
variable monthly wages.2 The basic monthly wage used for calculating 
contributions had a maximum bound of 775 EGP in 2008 (SSA 2009), and 
was raised to 875 EGP in 2011 (SAA 2011) as per the post-revolution reform 
measures that were applied by the Ministry of Finance. The maximum 
bound for the variable monthly wage was 500 EGP (Helmy 2004; SSA 
1 The overview of the Egyptian social insurance system in this section is based on Sieverding and Selwaness 
(2012).
2 The variable wage earnings are any earnings beyond the basic wage, including incentives, bonuses, etc.
72009), and was also raised to 1,050 EGP in 2011.3  Additionally, in July 
2012, the first post-revolution Minister of Social Solidarity passed law 
No. 102, which stipulates an annual increase of 15% on the maximum 
pensionable variable wage.  This law also immediately raised the ceiling on 
the pensionable base wage to 900 EGP and on the pensionable variable 
wage to 1,200 EGP.  Therefore, the total monthly pensionable wage have a 
maximum ceiling of 1275 EGP in 2006 (SSA 2007), 1,925 EGP in 2011 and 
is currently 2,100 EGP. 
Contributions are set as a fixed percentage of the pensionable wage 
or the wage reported to the social insurance authority up to the above 
mentioned ceiling levels. The total contribution amounts to 41% of basic 
wage and 25% of variable wage, which is paid by employees, employers 
and the government. Employees contribute 14% and 10% of their base 
and variable earnings, respectively; while employers contribute 26% and 
15% of the base and variable earnings, respectively. The government 
contributes only 1% of the base wage in addition to covering any deficit 
in the system (Helmy 2004). Hence, these benefits are mainly financed by 
the employers and employees contributions.4
Old age, invalidity and survivor pensions could be claimed for insured 
persons who meet the eligibility conditions: being 60 years old with 120 
months of contributions or 50 years old with 240 months of contributions. 
Early retirement is possible under certain conditions. As mentioned above, 
the pensions are calculated on a defined benefit basis for the basic wage 
and the variable wage. Old-age base pensions represent usually a certain 
amount of the average monthly base earnings during the last two years 
for public sector employees and civil servants multiplied by the years of 
contribution up to 36 years. For private sector employees, the earnings 
upon which the base pension is calculated is the average monthly base 
earnings for the last two years or for the five years before the last two 
years multiplied by 1.4, whichever is lower - up to the base earning ceiling 
for the year of concern (e.g. 875 EGP in 2011) - then also multiplied by 
the years of contributions, up to 36 years. Variable pensions are calculated 
upon the reference variable earning which is the average monthly variable 
earning computed for the whole duration of contribution increased by 
2%, up to the variable wage ceiling for the year of concern (e.g. 1,050 EGP 
in 2011). The total pension has a maximum bound and should not exceed 
80% of the reference monthly total earnings (SSA 2011).5
3 In October 1st 2012, one US dollar was about 6.10 EGP. 
4 These contribution rates are considered to be very high, in comparison to rates applied in other MENA coun-
tries.  For instance, the employers’ and employees’ contribution rates combined in the Maghreb countries 
and Jordan range from only 8 to 14% (Helmy 2008).
5 For more details, see SSA (2011) and Sieverding and Selwaness (2012).
8On the other hand, the Law 108/1976 provides voluntary old-age, 
invalidity and death insurance to the non-wage workers who are 21 to 
60 years old.  The contributions rates are set lower than those of the 
general scheme law 79/1975, reaching 15% of the covered monthly payroll. 
Moreover, non-wage workers can choose the level of their insurable 
monthly earnings within the range of 50 to 900 EGP. Contributions 
represent 15% of such monthly declared income. The insured person has 
the right to change his earnings level under some conditions stated in 
the law. Workers aged 65 years whose contributions were paid during 120 
months are eligible to retire. Likewise, early retirement is possible under 
certain conditions. The pensions are calculated as a share of the declared 
monthly income or as a share of its average in case of changes in income 
brackets, multiplied by the number of years of contribution, given that the 
pension does not exceed 80% of average monthly income and is not below 
35 EGP (Maait et al. 2000).
According to law 50/1978, the system also covers Egyptians working 
abroad on a voluntary basis. Moreover, the SIS has two non-contributory 
schemes regulated by law 112/1980, which are the Comprehensive Social 
Insurance Scheme (CSIS) and the Sadat Pension Plan, to insure those who 
are not covered by any of the previously mentioned laws. These schemes 
aim at providing financial support and insurance for the working poor 
who have not been included in or covered by any of the previous schemes, 
like casual workers, in case of old age, disability, and survivorship. Sadat 
pension also cover individuals aged 65 and above who have no pensions 
and are considered as inheritors for deceased persons before 1980. 
Nevertheless, several shortcomings of the SIS have often been 
highlighted in the literature. First, the high social insurance contribution 
rates, requested form both employees and employers, create a disincentive 
for participation. Second, the system acts as a regressive tax due to 
the presence of maximum ceiling on pensionable wage.  This ceiling 
encourages wage workers to underreport their wages, in order to evade the 
high contributions they are paying.  Also, by putting a maximum bound 
for the pensionable wage, the system loses a large part of the contributions 
that could have been collected from the high-income workers if there was 
no maximum ceiling on insurable earnings. Third, the fact that pension 
amount is based on the average monthly earnings during only the last few 
years in service encourages workers to underreport their pensionable wage 
during their first years of service, and then fully report their wages later 
near the end of their service to get high pensions. In other words, the way 
the pension is determined gives room for workers and employers to get 
around the system in order to pay lower contributions (Helmy 2008).  
9Accordingly, before the January 25th revolution, a new social insurance 
law (Law 135 of 2010) was scheduled to go into effect in January, 2012. 
However, due to the revolution this law has not been effective yet.  The 
aim of this law is to avoid some of the shortcomings of the original system.
The main essence of this new law is to closely connect the worker 
paid contributions during his/her working years to what he/she gets as 
retirement pensions.  This is a major change, since the earlier scheme 
only connected retirement payment to the last five years of contributions. 
This system implies the implementation of individual workers national 
accounts that should be gradually replacing the actual insurance PAYG 
system. National accounts are individual virtual accounts that will contain 
employees’ contributions and will be then disbursed at the time of their 
claim with accumulated interest. According to this reform, the social 
insurance system will change from being based on defined benefits to be 
based on defined contributions. The new system is supposed to increase 
the contribution rate paid by the employees to an average of 16.5% and 
decrease the employers’ contribution on behalf of their employees to 
an average of 10%. Employees would also have the right to pay higher 
contributions if they want. Under this reform, the retirement age would 
be 65 instead of 60 years old. This increase in age is supposed to occur 
gradually to reach 61 in 2015, 62 in 2018, 64 in 2024 and finally reaching 65 
in 2027. Also, Law 135 introduced new measures to include workers in the 
informal economy and in activating unemployment pensions, which had 
been inactive in the earlier law (SSA 2010; Sabreen and Maait 2011).
3. Literature Review
Social insurance coverage in developing countries has been the main 
focus of several studies. Social insurance has been tackled in research on 
informality of labor markets, where informality is being defined as the 
lack of social security (Henley, Arabsheibano and Carneiro 2006; Pages 
and Madrigal 2008; Maloney and Bosch 2007; Bosch et al. 2007). Henley, 
Arabsheibano and Carneiro (2006) estimate the determinants of being 
informal using different definitions for informality. Some studies focus on 
whether informality is a free choice, or imposed by the labor market rules. 
Pages and Madrigal (2008) find that low-skilled workers may value the 
informal wage jobs and the self-employment jobs more than the formal 
ones since the latter imply paying social security contributions. The authors 
suggest that this could be due to several reasons: the non-affordability of 
deferring present consumption to the future for the low-skilled workers 
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who are in majority poor, having a shorter life expectancy along with more 
reliance on family safety nets (mainly through intergenerational transfers), 
or that these benefits are not considered cost-effective by those workers. 
Maloney and Bosch (2007) and Bosch et al. (2007) show that informality 
may be a preferred choice for self-employed workers, but a last resort for 
informal salaried workers, who cannot afford to stay unemployed until 
finding a formal sector job.
Other research has directly studied access to social insurance 
coverage. Auerbach et al. (2007) is one of the first empirical studies on 
social insurance that tries to explain the low participation rates of wage 
workers in the social security system, by comparing the determinants of 
coverage among wage-workers, whose participation is mandatory, to that 
of non-wage workers, whose participation is voluntary. This study finds 
that the weak law enforcement combined with the low willingness of 
workers to participate in the system is among the main reasons behind 
the low coverage rates. More specifically, low coverage is not only driven 
by demand factors (from the workers side), but also by employer’s choice 
to insure their workers in the presence of weak law enforcement. Some 
studies  attempt to evaluate the labor market distortion that is caused by 
the social protection system, with its two components: social insurance 
and social assistance programs. Cuesta and Olivera (2010) find that the 
presence of non-contributive systems that are free for poor informal 
workers may create incentives for workers to work informally (i.e. without 
contributing to the social insurance). In the same spirit, Cuesta and 
Bohorquez (2011) analyze labor market transitions during 2008-2009 in 
Columbia and its linkage to the social security coverage. The authors find 
that workers may equally value the non-contributive and the contributive 
schemes; and hence the presence of both schemes simultaneously may 
encourage workers to opt for informality to avoid paying social insurance 
contributions.
In the MENA countries, with the increasing trend of informalization 
witnessed during the late 1990s, the phenomenon of the lack of social 
security coverage has become more widespread. Tansel (1999) studies 
the wage differentials between the covered and uncovered wage workers 
in Turkey, accounting for the selection into four employment statutes: 
not working; covered wage-worker; uncovered wage worker; and other 
employment.  Urdinola and Tanabe (2012) empirically estimates the 
determinants of labor informality in the MENA region, mainly defined as 
lack of social insurance coverage. In Egypt, empirical studies have mainly 
tackled the phenomenon of informality where it is mainly defined as the 
lack of both legal contract and social security coverage (Wahba 2009; 
Mokhtar and Wahba 2002).  Wahba (2009) examines the effect of the new 
labor law of 2003. This law provides flexibility in the hiring and firing 
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procedures, since the inflexibility of the Egyptian labor market has often 
been seen as one of the major obstacles to job creation in Egypt.  The 
author finds that the new law has increased formal employment, among 
those who were employed in 1998, in the private non-agricultural sector, 
but has no effect on new entrants to the labor market.  Nevertheless, to our 
knowledge, there have been no studies investigating the linkage between 
the patterns of social insurance coverage and the SIS regulations in Egypt. 
4. Data 
The analysis of this paper relies on data from the 1998 Egypt Labor 
Market Survey (ELMS 98) and the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Sample 
Survey (ELMPS 06). The ELMS 98 and ELMPS 06 were conducted by 
the Economic Research Forum (ERF) in cooperation with the Egyptian 
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). 
The ELMS 98 was carried out on a nationally-representative sample of 
4,816 households. The ELMPS 06 is a follow-up survey to the ELMS 
98, representing a longitudinal survey that tracks the labor market and 
demographic characteristics of the households and individuals interviewed 
in 1998, and any new households that might have formed as a result of 
splits from the original households. The ELMPS 06 sample consists of a 
total of 8,349 households.6
This paper focuses only on the working age population (WAP), which 
is the age group 15-64. The analysis is also restricted  to the sample of 
working men and women, based on the market definition of the labor 
force. The analysis mainly distinguishes between wage and non-wage 
workers, since as discussed above the social insurance scheme for each of 
these types of workers is different. The sample of wage workers is about 
4,633 workers in the ELMS 98, and about 7,456 workers in the ELMPS 06; 
while the sample of non-wage workers is about 1,183 workers in the 1998 
survey and 2,632 workers in the 2006 survey.  
5. Social Insurance Coverage on the Egyptian Labor Market 
This section presents a descriptive assessment of the patterns and 
dynamics of social insurance coverage in Egypt. It investigates the 
dynamics of social insurance coverage among wage and non-wage workers 
6 For more details on the data description, see Assaad (2007) and Assaad & Roushdy (2008).
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(including employers and self-employed) over the last few decades.  This 
section also examines how long it takes an individual to get access to social 
insurance coverage on the Egyptian labor market, the characteristics of 
covered workers and the extent of the issue of underreporting insurable 
earnings.
5.1 Dynamics of the Social Insurance
Access to social insurance among all workers declined from about 52% 
in 1998 to less than 42% in 2006 (Figure 1).  As expected, wage workers 
are more likely to have social insurance compared to all types of non-wage 
workers, including employer, self-employed and unpaid family workers. 
In 2006, about 58% of wage workers had social insurance coverage; 
compared to only 22% of employers, 18% of self-employed and less than 
2% of unpaid family workers.
The observed decline in access to social insurance in 2006 has been fairly 
broad, cutting across both wage and non-wage workers.  Nevertheless, this 
decline has been more prominent among employers (13 percentage points 
decline) and self-employed (7 percentage points decline) relative to wage 
workers (5 percentage points decline).7  
Figure 1: Percent of Workers (15-64 years old) who have Social Insurance Coverage by 
Employment Status in 1998, and 2006
Source: Constructed by the authors from ELMS 98 and ELMPS 06
7 These results do not contradict with the studies which showed that formality (defined as being employed 
with the benefit of either social security coverage or a legal contract) has increased due to the labor law 
No.12 issued in 2003 (see Wahba 2009). The 2003 law has brought flexibility in hiring and firing of workers; 
so its effects has been more obvious in the increasing number of legal contracts, rather than an increase in 
accesses to social insurance coverage.  
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Let us focus now on wage workers and explore more the evolution of 
social insurance in the private and public sector; using the individual-level 
retrospective information available in the ELMPS 06.  Figure 2 presents 
the percentage distribution of first jobs for wage workers by year of entry 
into the labor market and sector of employment (public, private with 
social insurance coverage and private with no social insurance coverage), 
during the period 1960-2006.  
The figure confirms that following the guaranteed employment scheme 
of the 1960s, the Egyptian public sector was the main creator of formal 
employment opportunities and typically the preferred sector by most new 
entrants to the labor market.8 However, by late 1980s and early 1990’s, the 
public sector jobs started to decline in favor of the informal private sector. 
This is the period during which the Economic Reform Structural and 
Adjustment Program (of 1991) was implemented with the World Bank and 
IMF. This economic reform has curbed new employment opportunities 
in the public sector and initiated a privatization program of existing 
public enterprises (Mokhtar and Wahba 2002). Nevertheless, as shown in 
Figure 2, the share of private sector wage workers who had access to social 
insurance during their first jobs, although growing, has continued to be 
very small during this period. In contrast, uninsured wage employment 
has been making up a substantial and growing share of total first jobs since 
late 1980s.
The share of private sector wage workers, who had no access to social 
insurance coverage during their first job, reached its peak of 52% of total 
first employment in 1999. This confirms the known fact about the failure 
of the private sector in Egypt, not only in absorbing all new entrants after 
the shrinking role of the government sector, but also in ensuring formality 
or social security coverage to all its entrants.
8 This guaranteed employment scheme took place since the promulgation of law 14 in 1964, which was later 
amended by law 85 in 1973.
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Figure 2:  Distribution of First Job by Year of Entry and Employment Status, 
WAP (15-64), 1960 to 2005
Figure 3 turns to exploring the role of job tenure in acquiring social 
insurance coverage. This figure compares the share of the private sector 
wage workers who had no access to social insurance among first entrants, 
among those with 5 years working experience and among those with 10 
years of experience. The figure shows that, as expected, acquiring social 
insurance coverage in the private sector does not often come at first entry; 
gaining such access takes time. The share of private sector wage workers 
with no social insurance is highest among labor market first entrants, 
followed by those having 5 years of experience, and lowest among those 
with at least 10 years of working experience. However, as discussed above, 
the percent of those with no social insurance has been increasing over 
time among all the three working experience categories.
15
Figure 3:  Distribution of Uninsured Private Sector Wage Workers by Job Tenure,  WAP (15-64), 
1960 to 2006
5.2 Characteristics of Socially Insured Wage and Non-wage 
Workers 
This section explores the characteristics of workers, who have social 
insurance coverage, and their enterprise-specific characteristics. Table 1 
presents the main characteristics of insured wage and non-wage workers. 
The table shows that the only groups which enjoyed an increase in their 
social insurance coverage between 1998 and 2006 are prime age wage 
workers (about 4.5 percentage points increase), wage workers in the private 
sector (2.7 percentage points increase) and those working for wage in the 
agriculture sector (4 percentage points increase).  
Among wage workers, females are more likely to be covered (72%) than 
males (53%). This is expected, since generally more females are working in 
the public sectors than males in Egypt (see Assaad and Roushdy 2007).9 
In contrast, among non-wage workers, females (5%) are less likely to be 
covered than males (23%). Marriage, living in an urban neighborhood, 
and being the household heads increase the likelihood of having access 
to social insurance among both wage and non-wage workers. Also, age is 
9 In 2006, more than 70% of females were working in the public sector compared to only 40% of males wage 
workers.
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strongly associated with acquiring social insurance coverage among both 
types of workers.  In 2006, 83% of wage workers and 24% of non wage 
workers aged 50-64 have access to social insurance coverage, compared 
to only 30% of wage workers and 14% of non-wage workers aged 15-29.10 
Moreover, as discussed above (Figure 3), the percent of covered wage 
workers substantially increases with years of experience; but, as expected, 
this relationship is less pronounced among non-wage workers. 
Education plays an important role in one’s coverage status, particularly 
among wage workers. Only a third of wage workers with no education 
have social insurance  coverage, compared to more than 80% among those 
with above intermediate education. This positive association between 
education and access to social insurance is less pronounced among non-
wage workers. 
Among wage workers, blue collar high and low skilled workers tend 
to have lower access to social security in comparison to the white collar 
occupation groups.11 Also, access to social security among white collar wage 
workers substantially increases with skill, but this relation is surprisingly 
reversed among the blue collar group. In contrast, non-wage workers’ 
access to social insurance is highest among the white-collar highly skilled 
occupation group followed by the blue collar low skill group. This result 
is discussed further in the next section. Table 1 shows that firm size 
substantially increases the likelihood of having access to social insurance 
benefits among wage workers.  More than 66% of wage workers of large 
firms (50 or more workers) have social insurance coverage, compared to 
less than 25% among those working for wages in small firms (fewer than 
10 workers).  However, once again this relationship is much weaker among 
non-wage workers.
As highlighted in Figures 2 and 3, wage workers employed in the 
government sector or in state owned enterprises are almost four times 
as likely to have social insurance (more than 94% and 93% respectively) 
than those working in the private sector (less than 24%). There are no 
non-wage workers in the government or the public sector. Contrary to 
expectation, the percent of covered workers in the private sector is larger 
10 One should be careful in interpreting these data on the youngest age groups (15 – 29) as a large portion of 
individuals in this group might still be in school.  
11 These skill groups are based on the ILO’s International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISOC 1988). 
The major groups of ISOC-88 are condensed into the following 4 skill groups: (1) White-collar, high-skill (leg-
islators, senior officials and managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals); (2) White-
collar, low-skill (clerks, service workers, and shop and sales workers); (3) Blue-collar, high-skill (skilled ag-
ricultural and fishery workers, and craft and related trade workers); and (4) Blue-collar, low-skill (plant and 
machine operators and assemblers and elementary occupations). Information on ISCO-88 can be found at 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/isco88e.html.  Last accessed on October 10, 2012. 
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among non-wage workers (30%) than their wage worker counterparts 
(22%) in 1998, and is only 4 percentage points lower than their wage 
workers counterparts.  The share of covered wage workers is highest in 
the transportation, storage and communication sector and the other 
services activity group, followed by the industry sector, and lowest among 
those working in agriculture. These patterns hold constant for non-wage 
workers. 
The ELMS 98 and ELMPS 06 divide Egypt into six regions: Greater 
Cairo, Alexandria and the Suez Canal cities, Urban Lower Egypt, Urban 
Upper Egypt, Rural Lower Egypt, and Rural Upper Egypt.  Among 
both wage and non-wage workers, access to social insurance is highest 
among firms located in Alexandria and Suez Canal followed by firms 
located in the urban Lower and urban Upper regions. The lowest access 
to social insurance is observed in rural Upper Egypt.  Differences in law 
enforcement levels in the metropolitan and the urban regions, relative to 
rural areas, is probably the main reason behind these regional variations in 
access to social insurance coverage (Tansel, 1999).  On the other hand, the 
individual’s perception and knowledge of social insurance of those residing 
in rural areas generally varies from that of their urban counterparts. Also, 
rural workers often rely on their social networks and families as social 
safety nets rather than the social insurance system (see Sieverding 2012).
Table 1: Percent of Workers with Social Insurance, by Employment Status and Workers’ 
Characteristics, WAP (15-64), 1998, 2006.
Wage Work Non-Wage Work
  1998 2006 1998 2006
Total (%) 62.3 56.9 30.2 20.0
Worker’s  Characteristics
Female 78.0 71.7 9.3 5.3
Male 58.5 53.2 32.8 22.8
Married 73.6 68.3 33.1 21.3
Not Married 39.5 31.4 16.2 13.3
Age
   15-29 33.8 29.9 11.1 13.8
   30-49 76.1 70.5 31.0 20.8




   Illiterate/ read or write1 35.4 31.9 19.9 11.2
   Less than intermediate 49.9 40.9 37.4 26.1
   Intermediate 70.7 57.7 37.6 23. 6
   Above Intermediate 89.3 81.1 58.9 46.2
Years of Experience
   < 5 years 41.7 33.9 10.0 5.6
   5 - 9 years 49.6 43.9 17.9 18.7
   10-14 years 60.4 51.8 27.5 22.1
   15 + years 72.7 69.61 33.7 20.8
Occupation
   White collar high skill 92.4 89.1 53.9 40.5
   White collar low skill 73.3 57.2 22.1 19.5
   blue collar high skill 22.5 17.2 10.6 7.6
   blue collar low skill 55.7 43.9 37.1 33.6
Residence
   Urban 72.5 65.2 49.9 34.6
   Rural 51.4 48.0 17.8 11.9
Household Head 72.0 67.5 36.3 23.5
Not Head 52.1 45.1 11.5 9. 9
Enterprise Characteristics
Region
   Greater Cairo 73.4 66.0 46.3 34.1
   Alexandria & Suez Canal 78.9 67.0 56.7 41.9
   Urban Lower 74.6 66.7 54.9 36.6
   Urban Upper 76.0 69.5 47.0 29.7
   Rural Lower 59.6 53.6 25.0 12.4
   Rural Upper 57.2 43.0 6.9 8.6
Firm Size
   < 10 workers 11.1 24.7 - 20.3
   10-49 workers 31.1 33.5 - 20.0
   50+ workers 66.9 66.2 - 25.6
   Do not know 15.6 89.8 - 10.8
Sector of Ownership
   Government 96.7 95.0 - -
continued u
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   State Own Enterprises 96.5 93.8 - -
   Private Sector 22.0 23.6 30.2 20.0
Economic Activity 
   Agriculture & Fishing 11.6 14.7 7.8 3.2
   Broad manufacturing group 54.4 54.3 40.1 30.0
   Construction 19.4 15.9 18.1 9.3
Wholesale & retail trade, hotel &     
restaurant
35.3 24.7 39.4 29.3
   Transp., storage & communication 75.2 58.8 63.9 49.5
   Other services 87.6 87.0 58.7 42.6
Total number of workers 4,636 7,389 1,184 2,630
1Illiterate or can only read and write, but has no education certificate.
5.3 Underreporting Insurable Basic Salary
As discussed above, the high social insurance contribution rate expected 
from employers causes many of them to enroll their employees in the 
system at a lower basic wage than their actual salary, in order to reduce the 
amount of the contribution they pay.  This section exploits a unique piece 
of information collected in the ELMPS 06, which is the wage reported by 
the employer to the social insurance authorities as distinct from the actual 
wage the worker is paid, to explore the phenomenon of reporting lower 
basic salary in the private wage work sector in Egypt.12  The data show that 
in 2006, in the sample of 4,323 wage workers, about 23% had lower basic 
wage reported to the insurance system than they actually earn. 
Table 3 shows that females are more likely to have their full basic wages 
reported. This does not come as a surprise; since, as mentioned above, 
more females are employed in the public sector.  Also, the percentage of 
underreporting is fewer among married workers. There is no substantial 
difference in the likelihood of having full salary reported to the insurance 
authority by workers’ urban\rural residence and household headship 
status.   
The percent of underreporting of basic salary significantly increases 
with wage. Percent of underreporting is more than 31% among workers 
in the highest wage quintile, compared to less than 18% among those 
falling in the two lowest wage quintiles.  This confirms that the social 
insurance system might be acting as a regressive tax where low-income 
workers pay contributions on their entire wage while high-income workers 
12 Information about wage reported by the employer to the social insurance authorities was not collected in 
the 1998 survey (ELMS 98).  
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pay contributions on only a part of their wage; since wages of the latter 
group exceed the maximum ceiling of the insurable earnings that the law 
stipulates (Sieverding and Selwaness 2012).
Underreporting is only slightly higher among the youngest group 
(26%), relative to the middle (22%) and prime age workers (23%).  Also, 
underreporting only slightly increases with experience. This might be 
due to the above mentioned regressive tax characteristics, since workers’ 
wages often increases with age and experience. 
Those with intermediate or higher levels of education are more likely 
to have their full basic salary reported to the social insurance authority, 
relative to those with a lower education level. Also, white collar high and 
low skilled workers are more likely (more than 15 percentage points) to have 
their full basic salary reported, relative to their blue collar counterparts. 
Blue collar low skill workers have the highest percent of underreporting. 
This partially explains the surprising results observed above. The higher 
percent of access to social insurance among this latter group, relative 
to their blue collar high skill group, comes with a higher percentage of 
underreporting of basic salary.
Almost 40% of wage workers in the private sector have a lower salary 
reported to the insurance authority compared to about 18% among those 
working in the government or state owned enterprises.13  Wage workers in 
the services sector are more likely to experience underreporting of their 
basic salary, followed by those working in manufacturing and construction. 
Surprisingly, wage workers of the agriculture sector are more likely to have 
their full basic salary reported to the system. Once again, this might be 
due to the lower salaries that are often observed in the agriculture and 
fishing sector compared to other economic activities. 
Individuals working in Alexandria and Suez Canal (16%), and Lower 
Egypt (19%) regions are less likely to have their basic salary underreported 
to the social insurance system, while the highest percentage of 
underreporting is observed in rural and urban Upper Egypt (26%). The 
phenomenon of underreporting of basic salary is more common in small 
firms (fewer than 10 workers), as those firms are more likely to be working 
informally.  Underreporting increases with firm size. Once again, this 
might be due to the fact that workers wages are generally higher in larger 
firms. 
13 This 18% of underreporting of basic salary in the public sector comes as a surprise.  The phenomenon of 
reporting lower basic salary is expected not to exist in the public sector, since evasion of the law is practically 
impossible in this sector. Accordingly, we expect that many respondents might have misunderstood the 
question, or confused basic wage with their total wage that also includes the variable wage. 
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Table 2:  Percent of Insured Wage Workers with Underreported Basic Salary to the Social 
Insurance Authority, WAP (15-64) in 2006








   15-29 25.5
   30-49 22.4
   50-64 22.5
Education Level
   Illiterate/Read or write1 31.1
   Less than intermediate 31.9
   Intermediate 21.4
   Above Intermediate 20.1
Years of Experience
   < 5 years 20.0
   5 - 9 years 22.4
   10-14 years 23.8
   15 + years 23.5
Occupation
   White collar high skill 19.3
   White collar low skill 22.0
   Blue collar high skill 35.4
   Blue collar low skill 39.5
Basic Monthly Wage
   Lowest Quartile 17.1
   Second Quartile 17.6
   Third Quartile 21.6




   Urban 23.4





   Greater Cairo 24.4
   Alexandria & Suez Canal 16.1
   Urban Lower 19.1
   Urban Upper 26.6
   Rural Lower 19.2
   Rural Upper 26.4
Firm Size
   < 10 workers 38.1
   10-49 workers 24.1
   50+ workers 30.9
   Do not know 18.2
Sector of Ownership
   Government 18.5
   State Own Enterprises 17.8
   Private Sector 39.7
Economic Activity 
   Agriculture & Fishing 17.9
   Broad manufacturing group 25.7
   Construction 22.0
   Wholesale & retail trade, hotel & restaurant 34.0
   Transp., storage & communication 44.6
   Other services 18.6
Total number of workers 4,323
1Illiterate or can only read and write, but has no education certificate.
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6. Determinants of Access to Social Insurance Coverage 
This section is devoted to investigating the workers and enterprise-
specific determinants of social insurance coverage among wage and 
non-wage workers. The aim here is to explore more fully who gets social 
insurance, and where the jobs that offer social insurance coverage are 
found. This section also differentiate between wage workers and non-wage 
workers; since as discussed above, the laws regulating social insurance 
coverage are different for these two types of workers. 
The following probit regression is estimated to model the likelihood of 
having access to social insurance coverage for all workers and separately 
for wage and non-wage workers. The dependent variable takes the value 
1 if the worker, i, has access to social insurance coverage and zero other-
wise.  Xi  is a vector of the workers’ and household characteristics, while 
the vector Ei includes the enterprise-specific characteristics, and eh is the 
error term.
)(),|1Pr( hiiiii eEXEXSI ++′Φ=′= γβ
Worker-specific characteristics, include the following six variables: age, 
gender, marital status, education, years of experience, and occupation.  A 
dummy for being female and another for being married are, respectively, 
used to control for gender and marital status.  Age and its square are used 
to control for individual age.  Similarly, years of experience and its square 
are used to investigate the time dimension in acquiring social insurance 
coverage on the labor market.  Education is measured by three dummy 
variables (illiterate or can only read and write but has no certificate is the 
reference category): has less than an intermediate education, has an inter-
mediate education, and has an above intermediate education.  Occupa-
tion is measured by the three dummies indicating white collar low skill, 
blue collar high skill and blue collar low skill. The white collar high skill 
occupation group is the omitted category.  Additionally, a dummy vari-
able is included to account for whether the individual is the head of the 
household. The household structure is controlled for using a dummy for 
the presence of any other member in the household who has social insur-
ance coverage, the share of members in the household who are out of the 
labor force grouped into three age categories (0-14, 15-64, and above 65), 
and the household size.  
Moreover, in the all workers models, a dummy for being a wage worker 
is included (non-wage workers are the omitted category) to account for 
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employment status. Similarly, in the non-wage workers models a dummy 
for being an employer is included (self-employed is the omitted category). 
On the other hand, the enterprise-specific characteristics, which are 
common for both wage and non-wage workers, consist of the two vari-
ables: the region where the enterprise is located and the enterprise eco-
nomic activity.  In the regression models the five regional dummies are 
included, where Greater Cairo is the omitted category: Alexandria and 
the Suez Canal cities, urban Lower Egypt, urban Upper Egypt, rural Lower 
Egypt, and rural Upper Egypt. The enterprise economic activity is cap-
tured by the five dummies indicating whether the enterprise belongs to (i) 
a broad manufacturing and mining group that includes mining and quar-
rying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water supply activities; (ii) con-
struction; (iii) a broad trade group, including wholesale and retail trade, 
hotels, and restaurants; (iv) transportation, storage, and communication; 
and (v) other services.  The agriculture and fishing activity group is the 
reference category.
Furthermore, in the wage worker equation the enterprise sector and 
size is captured by a sector-size composite variable that consists of four 
groups: government or public enterprises (omitted category), private en-
terprises with 50 or more workers, private enterprises with 10–50 workers, 
and private enterprises with fewer than 10 workers.14  
A methodological concern arises here when empirically modeling ac-
cess to social insurance coverage.  In the all workers model, endogeneity 
of employment status may be encountered from the fact that workers may 
self-select themselves into wage and non-wage work depending on how 
they value social insurance and their expectation of getting access to social 
insurance in each of these two types of employment.15  For instance, if an 
individual who values social insurance has   higher expectation of having 
social insurance coverage in wage work, he/she may decide to wait for a 
wage job that offers social insurance benefits rather than opting for a non-
wage job. In contrast, an individual with less interest in social insurance 
might opt for non-wage work.  This would cause a statistically significant 
correlation to be observed between social insurance and wage work, but 
which should not be interpreted as a causal impact of wage work on access 
14 This variable could not be included in the non-wage workers equation.  There are no non-wage workers in 
the government and public sector enterprises. Also the percent of non-wage workers working in enterprises 
with more than 10 workers is very small (2.6%), which prevented the ivprobit model from converging.  
15  One might argue that the endogeneity of labor force participation needs to be taken care of first. However, 
this paper focuses on modeling access to social insurance among the employed group of individual, who 
have already decided to join the labor market and found a job. In other words, the analysis and results of 
this paper only holds for this group of employed workers, and not for all types of individuals who are often 
observed on the labor market (including the unemployed and the out of labor force).
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to social insurance. The same applies for employment status in the non-
wage worker models.   
Furthermore, enterprise-specific characteristics (such as sector and 
firm size) might also be endogenous to social insurance coverage, since 
enterprise or sector choices and getting access to social insurance may 
often be made simultaneously.16  For instance, an individual who values 
social insurance may self-select into the public sector or in a large private 
sector enterprise.17 Once again this reverse-causality may challenge the 
consistency of the model, by causing the enterprise characteristics to be 
correlated with unobserved determinants of access to social insurance. 
Hence, for an accurate econometric estimation, one needs to correct for 
this possible endogeneity. 
Instrumental variables (IV) technique is often used as a remedy for 
this endogeneity problem.  To apply IV technique, a set of instrumental 
variables are needed, which are correlated with the individual choices of 
employment status, sector, and enterprise size but uncorrelated with access 
to social insurance coverage. In the literature, parents’ education and their 
employment characteristics have been occasionally used to instrument for 
these individual job choices. 
Accordingly, in the following, in addition to estimating the single 
equation probit model, a two-stage IV probit model (using the ivprobit 
command in STATA) and a two-stage least square model (2SLS) are 
estimated, separately for all workers, wage workers and non-wage workers.18 
In the first-stage of each of the two-equation models, the employment 
status (sector-size) decision is estimated.  The worker’s parents’ education 
level, employment status and sector of employment are used as instrumental 
variables. These instruments are expected to be good proxies for workers’ 
16  One can argue here that this possible endogeneity might also apply to other enterprise-specific character-
istics included in the model. However, we believe that neither the enterprise economic activity, nor its loca-
tion is endogenous in the context of Egypt.  Nevertheless, we have separately investigated the endogeneity 
of each of these two variables, for wage and non-wage workers, and could not accept their endogeneity 
(results are available upon request). 
17  In Egypt small enterprises may be able to violate the law and work informally to avoid the cost of regis-
tration including paying social insurance for its worker. However, working informally is generally hard for 
large firms. The literature shows that enterprises with more than 10 employees are very unlikely to work 
informally. 
18  Although ivprobit command in STATA assumes continuous endogenous regressors and both the employ-
ment status and sector-size variables are categorical, the econometrics literature proved that ivprobit es-
timation would still provide consistent estimates in such occasions that outperform the two-stage linear 
model (2SLS) estimates (see Newey (1987)).  Nevertheless, later on, Angrist (1991) proved that a 2SLS 
model in case of a binary dependent outcome and binary endogenous variables can perform well under 
certain conditions (Acosta, 2006).
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employment status (sector-size) choice, since parents education and work 
experience often affects one’s own work choices, but do not directly affect 
his/her access to social insurance coverage. 
In the IV probit specifications, the exogeneity of employment status 
(sector-size) variable to access to social insurance is tested. The null 
hypothesis here is that the correlation between the error terms of the 
social insurance equation and the employment status (sector-size) choice 
equation, rho, is zero.  If this null hypothesis cannot be rejected, then we 
cannot reject that employment status (sector-size) choice is exogenous 
to social insurance coverage (i.e., the error terms are uncorrelated).  In 
such case, the results of the single equation probit model would be more 
efficient than those of the IV probit model.  On the other hand, if the 
error terms are correlated (i.e., the unobservables that affect the social 
insurance coverage status also influence the employment status (sector-
size) choice), the size of the coefficient of the employment status (sector-
size) variable is expected to be substantially larger in the two-equation 
models than in the single equation model.
Additionally, the 2SLS estimation allows for performing an over-
identification test, a weak instruments test, the Wooldridge’s (1995) score 
and the regression-based tests of endogeneity.  The Sargen’s test for over-
identification of the instrumental variables tests the null hypothesis that 
both instruments are valid; i.e. could be excluded from the social insurance 
equation.  A statistically significant Sargen’s test statistic indicates that 
the instruments may not be valid.  On the other hand, the test of the 
weakness of instruments is based on the Cragg Donald minimum 
eigenvalue statistic created by Cragg and Donald (1993). The value of this 
statistic is compared to critical values provided by Stock and Yogo (2005). 
This test provides measures of goodness of fit of the first-stage equation 
(employment status and sector-size).  It also uses an F-statistic to test 
the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the instruments are equal to 
zero in the first-stage equation.  The F-statistic is often compared in the 
literature to the threshold of 10 which is suggested by Staiger and Stock 
(1997).  An F-statistic below the threshold of 10 suggests the existence of 
a weak-instrument problem. 
6.1 Estimation Results
Tables 3, 4 and 5 presents the probit (Model 1), ivprobit (Model 2) 
and 2SLS (Model 3) models estimates of the social insurance equation, 
respectively, for all workers, wage workers and non-wage workers. 
Additionally, for wage workers (Table 4), two alternative specifications 
are presented.  The first three models control for the sector-size variable, 
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while the last three models (Models 4, 5 and 6) control only for working in 
the public sector.19,20  
In the all workers (Table 3) and the wage workers (Table 4) 2SLS models 
specifications, Sargen’s test for over-identification of the instruments does 
not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (p-values are 
substantially higher than the 10% level).  Additionally, for both models, 
the weak identification test provides an F-statistic that is substantially 
higher than the threshold rule of thumb of 10.  All the R2 statistics of 
the first-stage regressions are also relatively high, so they do not imply 
a weak-instrument problem. Hence, the null hypothesis that the instru-
ments are weak in both the all workers and wage workers models cannot 
be accepted.  Furthermore, in all the 2SLS models of Table 3 and 4, both 
the Wooldridge’s (1995) score and the regression-based tests of endogene-
ity reject the null hypothesis that wage work, public sector and sector-size 
variables are exogenous to social insurance coverage (p-values are smaller 
than 1% in all models). 
Moreover, the ivprobit estimation of both the all workers and wage 
workers models leads to a p-value smaller than 0.01 for the Wald-test of 
significance of rho.  Hence, the null-hypotheses that rho=0 cannot be ac-
cepted at 1% significance level.  In other words, we cannot reject that the 
error term of each of the employment status, public sector and sector-size 
equations is correlated with the error term of the social insurance equa-
tion.  In such case, the results of the two-equation models would be more 
efficient than those of the single equation probit model.  Accordingly, in 
the following the focus will be on the results of the ivprobit estimation. 
The all worker single equation model (Table 3) shows that wage work-
ers are more likely to have social insurance coverage than their non-wage 
workers counterparts; however, when the employment status is instru-
mented for, the effect of wage work on access to social insurance is no 
longer significant.  Contrary to the bivariate results, when controlling for 
worker and enterprise characteristics, females are less likely to have access 
to social insurance coverage relative to males.  Marriage increases the 
likelihood of having social insurance.  As expected, age and experience 
have an inverse U-shape relationship with access to social insurance.  The 
probability of access to social insurance significantly increases with educa-
tion level. Having a below intermediate education, relative to no educa-
tion degree, increases the likelihood of having social insurance coverage 
by 38 percentage points, by 74 percentage points for having intermediate 
19 Marginal effects are reported in all tables with robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects are 
based on marginal change for continuous variables and change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.  Coeffi-
cients are available upon request.
20 First stage estimation results of the ivprobit and 2SLS models are available upon request.
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education and by 87 percentage points for above intermediate education. 
Blue collar high and low skill workers are less likely to have access to so-
cial security in comparison to the white collar occupation groups.  These 
findings confirm the bivariate results. Furthermore, the presence of other 
socially insured members in the household positively increases the likeli-
hood of having access to social insurance coverage. This might be due to 
the spread of awareness regarding the importance of having social insur-
ance and how to attain such access among the household members.21 The 
share of household members aged 15-64 who are out of the labor force also 
increases the likelihood of workers’ access to social insurance.
Only working in Alexandria and Suez Canal, relative to Greater Cairo, 
significantly increase the probability of having social insurance coverage. 
In contrast, individuals working in rural Upper and rural Lower Egypt are 
less likely to have social insurance.  As mentioned above, this may be due 
to the difference in the enforcement level of social insurance laws that 
exist in the capital city compared to that in rural areas; and to how the 
urban workers value social insurance relative to their rural counterparts 
(see Sieverding 2012).  Compared to agriculture and fishing, the likelihood 
of having access to social insurance is higher among workers of all other 
economic activity groups, except for the wholesale and retail occupation 
group. It is highest among those working in the services sector followed by 
the broad manufacturing group, and then comes the construction group.
For wage workers (Table 4), the probit results (Model 1 and 4) show 
that working in the private sector, relative to the public sector, decreases 
the likelihood of having social insurance. Also, as expected, this likelihood 
decreases with firm size (Model 1). Similar effects are obtained after 
correcting for endogeneity.  The ivprobit (Model 2) and the 2SLS (Model 
3) estimation results show that the sector-size variable has a negative 
and strongly significant effect on access to social insurance among wage 
workers. Also, the ivprobit and 2SLS specification of Model 5 and 6 
confirms the positive effect of working in the public sector, relative to 
the private sector, on social insurance access among wage workers.  The 
ivprobit and the 2SLS estimation results are very similar, but substantially 
vary from the uncorrected single equation probit results.  Among wage 
workers, men and married workers are more likely to have access to social 
insurance in all model specifications.  Experience, but not age, has an 
inverse U-shape relationship with social insurance.  Surprisingly, correcting 
for endogeneity, not all education levels have a significant effect on access 
to social insurance, relative to no education, among wage workers.  Only 
having an above intermediate education (Model 3, 5 and 6), relative to 
21  The lack of awareness has often been pointed out as one of the main reasons of non-compliance to the social 
insurance system in qualitative research (see Barsoum et al. 2009 and Sieverding 2012).
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no education, shows some positive effects on access to social insurance. 
In all models specifications, working in rural Upper Egypt decreases the 
likelihood of being socially insured.  Also, working in rural Lower Egypt 
has a negative effect on social insurance only in Model 5 and 6.  Relative to 
agriculture and fishing economic activity group, in all model specifications, 
the likelihood of having access to social insurance is significantly higher in 
the wholesale and retail trade, and hotel and restaurants economic activity 
group. In contrast, wage workers in the other services economic activity 
group are less likely to be socially insured.    
Table 5 shows the estimation results of the non-wage worker models. 
In contrast to the all workers model, the endogeneity tests cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that employment status variable is exogenous to social 
insurance coverage for non-wage worker.  Also, the ivprobit estimation 
leads to a p-value higher than 0.10 for the Wald-test of significance of rho. 
Hence, the null hypothesis that the error term of each of the employment 
status equations is uncorrelated with the error term of the social insurance 
equation cannot be rejected.  In such case, the results of the probit 
model would be more efficient than those of the two-equation models. 
Accordingly, in the following the focus will be on the results of the probit 
estimation. 
The probit results of the non-wage worker model are very similar to 
the probit results of both the all worker and wage worker models. An 
exception is that, as one would expect, experience does not matter for 
non-wage worker. Marital status does not affect access to social insurance 
among non-wage workers. Also, the region of work shows different effects 
in the non-wage worker model. Working in urban Upper Egypt, relative to 
greater Cairo, increases the likelihood of having social insurance access. 
7. Determinants of Underreporting of Basic Salary 
This section explores the individual and enterprise characteristics that 
might motivate the decision to report a lower basic wage for social security 
deductions.  A probit specification is used here.  The dependent variable 
takes the value 1 if the worker’s wage reported to the social insurance 
authorities is lower than the actual wage the worker is paid; and zero 
otherwise. The explanatory variables consist of the same set of workers 
and enterprise characteristics included in the above social insurance wage 
workers models.  The workers basic monthly wage and years to retirement 
age of 64 are also controlled for here.
The regression results are presented in Table 6.  Models 1, 2 and 3 
present the regression results for all wage workers, while Models 4, 5 and 
6 focus only on private sector wage workers. Three model specifications 
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are investigated here.  Model 1 and 4 includes all individual and enterprises 
characteristics except monthly basic wage.  Basic wage is controlled for in 
Model 2 and 5.  In Model 3 and 6, the age is replaced by years to retirement 
age of 64. The table shows that gender and marital status do not have 
any significant effect on the probability of having an underreported 
basic wage to the social security authority.  Education is only significant 
when controlling for basic monthly earnings. In Model 2, having an 
above intermediate education significantly decreases the likelihood 
of underreporting basic wage.  In contrast, among private sector wage 
workers only (Model 3 and 4), having intermediate or below education 
level has a negative effect on the probability of underreporting. This 
result is expected, since public sector workers constitute a large group 
of the wage works sample, and underreporting is unlikely to exist in the 
public sector. Age is not a significant determinant of under reporting; but, 
experience has an inverse U-shape relationship with the probability of 
underreporting. Also, years to retirement has a positive and significant 
effect on the probability of underreporting (Model 3 and 6).  In other 
words, workers tend to underreport their basic wages during their early 
years of service, than start to fully report their wages near their retirement 
age. These results confirm one of the major shortcomings of the Egyptian 
social insurance system. As highlighted above, basing the pension on 
average monthly earnings during the last few years of service encourages 
workers and employers to get around the system regulations.  
Wage workers in Alexandria and Suez Canal governorates, relative to 
Greater Cairo, are more likely to have their basic salary fully reported. 
Controlling for wage (Model 3 and 4), rural regions also have a positive 
and significant effect on the probability of underreporting. Compared to 
agriculture and fishing, the probability of underreporting, in Model 1, is 
higher among all economic activity groups, except construction. When 
controlling for basic wage (Model 3), the wholesale and retail occupation 
group losses its significant effect.  In contrast, among private sector wage 
workers (Model 2 and 4), only transportation, storage and communication 
group has significantly higher probabilities of under reporting.  
As expected, among all wage workers, the probability of underreporting 
is significantly higher in the private sector, regardless of firm size, relative 
to the public sector. Within the private sector this probability is highest 
among workers of small size firms (10 or below) followed by large size 
firms (50 and above), and is lowest among middle size firms. This also 
holds when controlling for monthly wage and years to retirement age 
(Model 2 and 3). In contrast, among private sector wage worker (Model 4, 
5 and 6), only small size firms had a positive and significant effect on the 
likelihood of underreporting.  
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Finally, confirming the above findings, monthly basic salary is positively 
correlated with the probability of underreporting in both the all workers 
and private sector workers models.
8. Conclusion and Policy Implication
This paper contributes to the growing literature on informality and 
access to social insurance. To our knowledge, it is the first to investigate 
the pattern and dynamics of social insurance coverage in the Egyptian 
labor market and its determinants among wage and non-wage workers. 
The paper is also one of the few studies that focus on the phenomenon of 
underreporting salaries to the social security administration. 
The analysis shows that wage workers are more likely to have social 
insurance compared to all non-wage workers. In 2006, around 57.5% of 
wage workers had social insurance coverage compared to only 20% of 
non-wage workers (22% of employers and 18% of self-employed). Access 
to social insurance among all workers declined from about 52% in 1998 
to about 42% in 2006.  Both wage and non-wage workers have suffered 
from this observed decline.  This decline is often been attributed to the 
decline of public sector hiring in Egypt and the high cost of participation 
in the social insurance system, both of which resulted in an expansion of 
informal employment. 
The multivariate analysis of the determinants of access to social 
insurance revealed that men, more educated, white collar, older and more 
experienced wage workers tend to have social security coverage. The 
results among non-wage workers are slightly different than that of wage 
workers in terms of the impact of marital status and experience on the 
likelihood of having social insurance.  The findings confirm the stylized 
fact that experience on the job market is important for acquiring social 
insurance coverage among wage workers, but has no effect among non-
wage workers. Also, married wage workers are more likely to be covered, 
but marital status does not affect access to social insurance among non-
wage workers. On the enterprise front, access to social insurance is more 
likely to exist in the public sector, in large private enterprises and in the 
service economic activity group.  Finally, working in rural Upper Egypt 
relative to Greater Cairo decreases the likelihood of being socially insured 
among wage workers, but has no effect among non-wage workers.
On the reported insurable earnings front, in 2006, about 23% of wage 
workers had lower basic wage reported to the insurance system than they 
actually earn. Underreporting insurable wage is negatively correlated with 
education level. Experience in the labor market has an inverse U-shape 
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relationship with the probability of underreporting.  Also, underreporting 
increases with years to retirement age. In other words, workers tend to 
underreport their pensionable wage during their first years of service, and 
then fully report their wages near the end of their service. These results 
provide evidence to the fact that the way the pension is determined, based 
on the average monthly earnings during only the last few years of service, 
gives room for workers and employers to get around the system in order 
to pay lower contributions.
Furthermore, enrolling employees in the social insurance system at 
lower basic salary is highest in rural areas relative to the metropolitan 
governorates.  This is probably due to the difference in law enforcement 
levels that exist in the metropolitan and the urban regions, relative to 
rural areas. It could also be due to how the urban workers value social 
insurance relative to their rural counterparts.  Finally, the likelihood of 
underreporting increases with the worker’s monthly basic salary. In other 
words, low-income workers may be paying contributions on their entire 
wage, while high-income workers are paying contributions on only a part 
of their wage.    
These results confirm several shortcomings of the Egyptian social 
insurance system, which has often been highlighted in the literature.  The 
high contribution rates requested from both the employer and employee, 
combined with the presence of maximum ceiling of pensionable earnings, 
basing benefits on wage during the last few years of service, and weak 
law enforcement, encourages employers and employees to either not 
participate in the social insurance system or contribute on amounts that 
are lower than their actual wage (Sieverding and Selwaness 2012). 
The findings of this paper call for a set of inter-related reforms to the 
social insurance regulation in Egypt.  The ceiling on pensionable wage 
should be removed and retirement payment should be connected to the 
worker’s paid contributions during all of his/her working years.  Also, 
overall reduction in contribution rates is needed to encourage more 
participation, particularly among the working poor. Finally, these reforms 
should be supported by a more rigorous enforcement of social insurance 
law and awareness-raising campaigns, particularly among women and 
youth.   
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Table 3:  Determinants of Having Access to Social Insurance, all workers, 2006
 (1) (2) (3)
Variables Probit Ivprobit 2SLS
    
Wage worker 0.305*** -0.299 0.004
(0.018) (0.346) (0.074)
Female1 -0.045* -0.206*** -0.046***
(0.024) (0.076) (0.016)
Married2 0.130*** 0.327*** 0.087***
(0.021) (0.069) (0.014)
Age 0.043*** 0.056** 0.019***
(0.007) (0.025) (0.004)
Age square -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Less than intermediate3 0.156*** 0.384*** 0.104***
(0.023) (0.066) (0.016)
Intermediate3 0.243*** 0.737*** 0.169***
(0.022) (0.066) (0.018)
Above Intermediate3 0.256*** 0.871*** 0.195***
(0.026) (0.082) (0.022)
Experience3 0.011*** 0.038*** 0.006***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.002)
Experience square3 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
White collar low skill4 -0.196*** -0.219** -0.059***
(0.020) (0.096) (0.019)
Blue collar high skill4 -0.387*** -0.949*** -0.297***
(0.022) (0.084) (0.021)
Blue collar low skill4 -0.289*** -0.731*** -0.209***
(0.025) (0.098) (0.023)
Household (HH) head 0.078*** 0.109 0.019
(0.025) (0.082) (0.016)
HH members with SI coverage 0.170*** 0.406*** 0.069***
(0.018) (0.056) (0.011)
Share of HH members age 0-14 0.091* 0.132 0.036
(0.047) (0.124) (0.026)




Share of HH members age 15-64 
and out of the labor force
0.202*** 0.509*** 0.091***
(0.044) (0.124) (0.026)
HH size -0.014*** -0.011 -0.003
(0.004) (0.012) (0.002)
Alexandria & Suez Canal5 0.070*** 0.165** 0.045***
(0.024) (0.072) (0.017)
Urban Lower5 0.026 0.019 -0.005
(0.023) (0.073) (0.017)
Urban Upper5 0.051** 0.090 0.013
(0.022) (0.070) (0.015)
Rural Lower5 -0.053** -0.224*** -0.063***
  (0.025) (0.078) (0.019)
Rural Upper5 -0.075*** -0.360*** -0.073***
(0.029) (0.091) (0.021)
Broad manufacturing group6 0.355*** 1.231*** 0.273***
   (0.022) (0.093) (0.029)
Construction6  0.122*** 0.478*** 0.062**
   (0.036) (0.125) (0.029)








Other services6 0.472*** 1.696*** 0.385***
(0.025) (0.113) (0.037)
Observations 8,959 7,056 7,056
Wald chi2(26) 3356*** 2680*** 17173***
Pseudo R-squared 0.475 .
R-squared   0.522
 rho
Wald-test of rho=0 (p-value)
0.375***
0.002
Sargen›s test of over-identification 
(p-value)
0.9797












Robust score chi2 
(p-value)




Notes: Marginal effects are reported and robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 reference category: males
2 reference category: unmarried
3 reference category: no educational certificate (illiterate or read or write)
4 reference category: White collar high skill
5 reference category: Greater Cairo
6 reference category: Agriculture & Fishing
Table 4:  Determinants of Having Access to Social Insurance, Wage Workers, 2006
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Probit Ivprobit 2SLS Probit Ivprobit 2SLS
    
Female1 -0.048* -0.210** -0.061*** -0.045* -0.201** -0.068***
(0.027) (0.089) (0.019) (0.026) (0.078) (0.021)
Married2 0.078*** 0.096 0.038** 0.095*** 0.146* 0.064***
(0.024) (0.089) (0.019) (0.024) (0.077) (0.020)
Age 0.030*** -0.051* -0.002 0.033*** -0.018 0.007
(0.009) (0.029) (0.007) (0.008) (0.024) (0.007)
Age square -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Less than intermediate3 0.073*** -0.085 -0.008 0.076*** -0.135* -0.027
(0.025) (0.100) (0.024) (0.023) (0.080) (0.029)
Intermediate3 0.136*** 0.035 0.005 0.157*** 0.048 0.014
(0.027) (0.122) (0.025) (0.024) (0.100) (0.027)
Above Intermediate3 0.156*** 0.211 0.047* 0.183*** 0.308*** 0.095***
(0.031) (0.134) (0.025) (0.028) (0.116) (0.026)
Experience3 0.012*** 0.047*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.021** 0.001
(0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003)
Experience square3 -0.000* -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
White collar low skill4 -0.119*** 0.026 0.016 -0.133*** 0.103 0.042
(0.026) (0.102) (0.021) (0.025) (0.089) (0.029)
Blue collar high skill4 -0.209*** 0.656*** 0.118* -0.289*** 0.471** 0.077
continued u
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(0.036) (0.237) (0.070) (0.035) (0.190) (0.077)
Blue collar low skill4 -0.160*** 0.321 0.071 -0.161*** 0.639*** 0.181**
(0.040) (0.198) (0.051) (0.037) (0.166) (0.080)
Household (HH) head 0.040 -0.081 -0.032 0.056** -0.026 -0.014
(0.028) (0.091) (0.021) (0.027) (0.077) (0.022)
HH members with SI 
coverage 0.134*** 0.102 0.001 0.142*** 0.096 0.006
(0.019) (0.087) (0.014) (0.018) (0.076) (0.017)
Share of HH members 
age 0-14 0.084 0.037 -0.024 0.084* -0.100 -0.065*
(0.053) (0.140) (0.030) (0.051) (0.123) (0.038)
Share of HH members 
age 65+ 0.157 0.140 0.010 0.160* 0.004 -0.026
(0.097) (0.496) (0.099) (0.093) (0.418) (0.111)
Share of HH members 
age 15-64 and out of 
the labor force 0.174*** 0.183 0.018 0.191*** 0.198 0.035
(0.049) (0.149) (0.030) (0.047) (0.136) (0.036)
HH size -0.011*** -0.023* -0.005* -0.011*** -0.026** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003)
Alexandria & Suez 
Canal5 0.037 0.038 0.008 0.042* -0.040 -0.011
(0.024) (0.081) (0.018) (0.023) (0.075) (0.025)
Urban Lower5 0.001 0.057 0.005 -0.019 -0.056 -0.026
(0.025) (0.071) (0.016) (0.024) (0.064) (0.020)
Urban Upper5 -0.009 0.031 0.002 -0.010 -0.043 -0.017
(0.024) (0.068) (0.016) (0.023) (0.063) (0.020)
Rural Lower5 -0.098*** -0.031 -0.019 -0.130*** -0.236*** -0.084***
  (0.030) (0.078) (0.016) (0.030) (0.067) (0.019)
Rural Upper5 -0.181*** -0.248** -0.055*** -0.222*** -0.393*** -0.115***
(0.040) (0.115) (0.021) (0.038) (0.099) (0.022)
Broad manufacturing 
group6 0.184*** -0.012 0.011 0.219*** 0.202 0.099***
   (0.026) (0.172) (0.036) (0.022) (0.141) (0.031)
Construction6  0.032 0.035 0.006 0.057 0.081 0.034
   (0.041) (0.121) (0.029) (0.036) (0.107) (0.031)
Wholesale, retail trade, 
hotel & restaurant6 0.097*** 0.974*** 0.210*** 0.041 0.591*** 0.138***
(0.034) (0.127) (0.054) (0.036) (0.107) (0.051)
Transportation, storage 
& communication6 0.211*** 0.288 0.079* 0.186*** -0.142 -0.015
continued u
37
(0.020) (0.244) (0.042) (0.022) (0.192) (0.061)
Other services6 0.176*** -0.509** -0.120** 0.154*** -0.851*** -0.242***
(0.038) (0.207) (0.059) (0.036) (0.164) (0.089)
50+ workers7 -0.326***
   (0.036)
10-49 workers7 -0.551***
(0.027)
< 10 workers7 -0.712***
(0.018)
Sector-firm size -1.431*** -0.442***
(0.031) (0.061)
Public Sector 0.530*** 3.595*** 1.283***
(0.017) (0.055) (0.208)
Observations 6,336 4,807 4,807 6,513 4,939 4,939
Wald chi2(26) 2445*** 4958*** 7099*** 2232*** . 7169***
Pseudo R-squared 0.612 0.579 .
R-squared 0.485 0.260
 rho






Sargen›s test of over-
identification (p-value) 0.591 0.819














Robust score chi2    
(p-value)






Notes: Marginal effects are reported and robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 reference category: males
2 reference category: unmarried
3 reference category: no educational certificate (illiterate or read or write)
4 reference category: White collar high skill
5 reference category: Greater Cairo
6 reference category: Agriculture and Fishing
7 reference category: Government and Public sector
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Table 5:  Determinants of Having Access to Social Insurance, Non-wage Workers, 2006
 (1) (2) (3)
Variables Probit Ivprobit 2SLS
    
Employer7 0.112*** 0.969* 0.188*
(0.016) (0.512) (0.096)
Female1 -0.106*** -0.335 -0.001
(0.020) (0.305) (0.045)
Married2 0.009 0.129 0.052**
(0.024) (0.144) (0.023)
Age 0.017** 0.062* -0.003
(0.007) (0.035) (0.006)
Age square -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Less than intermediate3 0.076*** 0.285** 0.075***
(0.025) (0.111) (0.025)
Intermediate3 0.082*** 0.409*** 0.109***
(0.027) (0.112) (0.024)
Above Intermediate3 0.146*** 0.693*** 0.228***
(0.042) (0.150) (0.037)
Experience3 -0.000 0.001 0.007***
(0.003) (0.015) (0.003)
Experience square3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
White collar low skill4 -0.038** -0.031 -0.060
(0.019) (0.168) (0.039)
Blue collar high skill4 -0.073*** -0.127 -0.064
(0.024) (0.143) (0.039)
Blue collar low skill4 -0.075*** -0.167 -0.107*
(0.022) (0.320) (0.058)
Household (HH) head 0.036 0.186 0.021
(0.027) (0.200) (0.031)
HH members with SI coverage 0.057** 0.192* 0.047*
(0.025) (0.111) (0.024)
Share of HH members age 0-14 -0.001 -0.085 0.038
(0.047) (0.238) (0.050)




Share of HH members age 15-64 
and out of the labor force 0.126*** 0.645*** 0.159***
(0.044) (0.220) (0.048)
HH size -0.008* -0.028 -0.007*
(0.004) (0.024) (0.004)
Alexandria & Suez Canal5 0.052 0.242 0.072
(0.035) (0.149) (0.047)
Urban Lower5 0.036 0.189 0.041
(0.029) (0.128) (0.040)
Urban Upper5 0.075** 0.312** 0.067*
(0.033) (0.135) (0.040)
Rural Lower5 -0.002 0.023 -0.013
  (0.027) (0.137) (0.038)
Rural Upper5 0.021 0.165 0.025
(0.031) (0.154) (0.039)
Broad manufacturing group6 0.449*** 1.504*** 0.271***
   (0.048) (0.154) (0.039)
Construction6  0.164** 0.755** 0.078
   (0.071) (0.369) (0.065)
Wholesale & retail trade, hotel & 
restaurant6 0.323*** 1.521*** 0.256***
(0.039) (0.200) (0.049)
Transp., storage & 
communication6 0.744*** 2.499*** 0.580***
(0.056) (0.273) (0.075)
Other services6 0.467*** 1.685*** 0.327***
(0.071) (0.237) (0.066)
Observations 2445 2112 2112
Wald chi2(26) 526.7*** 489.6*** 761.9***
Pseudo R-squared 0.304 . .
R-squared 0.272
 rho
Wald-test of rho=0 (p-value)
-0.213
0.337   
Sargen›s test of over-
identification (p-value) 0.215












Robust score chi2 
(p-value)




Notes: Marginal effects are reported and robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 reference category: males
2 reference category: unmarried
3 reference category: no educational certificate (illiterate or read or write)
4 reference category: White collar high skill
5 reference category: Greater Cairo
6 reference category: Agriculture & Fishing
7 reference category: self-employed
Table 6: Determinants of Underreporting Basic Salary, Wage Workers, 2006
 All Wage Workers Private Sector Wage Workers
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
    
Female1 -0.032 -0.011 -0.011 -0.028 0.011 0.015
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.063) (0.067) (0.066)
Married2 -0.020 -0.023 -0.021 0.038 0.039 0.033
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.064) (0.066) (0.065)
Age -0.005 -0.000 -0.019 -0.017
(0.007) (0.007) (0.020) (0.021)
Age square 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Less than 
intermediate3
0.022 0.008 0.006 -0.128* -0.133** -0.131*
(0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067)
Intermediate3 -0.005 -0.041 -0.042 -0.181*** -0.186*** -0.183**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.070) (0.071) (0.072)
Above 
Intermediate3
0.018 -0.052* -0.052* -0.058 -0.125 -0.124
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096)
Experience3 0.008*** 0.006* 0.006** 0.022** 0.018* 0.015*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Experience 
square3
-0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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White collar low 
skill4
0.000 0.017 0.017 0.010 0.044 0.045
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.062) (0.064) (0.064)
Blue collar high 
skill4 
0.096*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.177** 0.182** 0.183**
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079)
Blue collar low 
skill4
-0.027 -0.016 -0.017 -0.084 -0.071 -0.071
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070)
Household (HH) 
head
-0.021 -0.029 -0.028 -0.033 -0.090 -0.090
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.070) (0.073) (0.073)
HH members 
with SI coverage
-0.011 -0.020 -0.021 -0.029 -0.067 -0.061
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052)
Share of HH 
members age 
0-14
0.020 0.028 0.031 0.020 0.044 0.043
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.129) (0.131) (0.132)
Share of HH 
members age 
65+ 
0.095 0.075 0.080 0.127 0.042 0.030
(0.082) (0.081) (0.080) (0.237) (0.244) (0.245)
Share of HH 
members age 
15-64 and out of 
the labor force
-0.029 -0.057 -0.058 0.185 0.143 0.154
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.130) (0.129) (0.126)
HH size 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Alexandria & 
Suez Canal5
-0.097*** -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.119** -0.107** -0.107**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
Urban Lower5 -0.025 -0.008 -0.008 -0.041 -0.015 -0.014
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.055) (0.058) (0.058)
Urban Upper5 -0.001 0.019 0.019 0.028 0.034 0.035
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055)
Rural Lower5 -0.031 0.004 0.004 0.143 0.175* 0.180*
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106)
Rural Upper5 0.025 0.067** 0.067** 0.072 0.113 0.114






0.100* 0.089 0.089 0.110 0.126 0.129
   (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.125) (0.126) (0.125)
Construction6  0.038 0.015 0.016 0.135 0.114 0.115
   (0.066) (0.062) (0.063) (0.156) (0.157) (0.156)
Wholesale, retail 
trade, hotel & 
restaurant6
0.102 0.077 0.077 0.150 0.142 0.145




0.179*** 0.140** 0.140** 0.318** 0.280** 0.281**
(0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.138) (0.143) (0.142)
Other services6 0.077* 0.087** 0.087** 0.038 0.085 0.085
(0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.137) (0.143) (0.142)
50+ workers7 0.125*** 0.074** 0.074** 0.030 0.027 0.028
   (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
10-49 workers7 0.103*** 0.045 0.046
(0.038) (0.035) (0.035)
< 10 workers7 0.389*** 0.309*** 0.308*** 0.269*** 0.252*** 0.253***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055)
Ln Basic 
monthly wage
0.158*** 0.158*** 0.190*** 0.191***






Observations 4,104 4,104 4,104 736 736 736
Wald chi2(26) 291.5 493.2 493.9 131.6 156.5 153.5
Pseudo 
R-squared
0.0708 0.129 0.128 0.148 0.187 0.187
1 reference category: males
2 reference category: unmarried
3 reference category: no educational certificate (illiterate or read or write)
4 reference category: White collar high skill
5 reference category: Greater Cairo
6 reference category: Agriculture and fishing
7 reference category: Government and public sector
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